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Abstract— Honeypots are a useful tool for discovering the
distribution of malicious traffic on the Internet and how that
traffic evolves over time. In addition, they allow an insight into
new attacks appearing. One major problem is analysing the large
amounts of data generated by such honeypots and correlating
between multiple honeypots. Honey Plotter is a web-based query
and visualisation tool to allow investigation into data gathered by
a distributed honeypot network. It is built on top of a relational
database, which allows great flexibility in the questions that can
be asked and has automatic generation of visualisations based on
the results of queries. The main focus is on aggregate statistics but
individual attacks can also be analysed. Statistical comparison of
distributions is also provided to assist with detecting anomalies
in the data; helping separate out common malicious traffic from
new threats and trends. Two short case studies are presented to
give an example of the types of analysis that can be performed.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper introduces a tool for navigating and visualising
data from a distributed honeypot network. The tool allows flex-
ible examination of both aggregate traffic statistics and detailed
characteristics, cross-correlation between multiple honeypots
and the detection of anomalies via the statistical comparison
of traffic distributions.
One of the main problems implementing effective network
traffic analysis tools is the large volumes of raw data involved.
Most honeypots deal with this by only storing a small amount
of ‘per flow’ information. However, in this project, all the
packets are recorded to allow more flexibility in examining
the malicious activities. The problem is addressed through the
use of a relational database and a web-based user interface to
interact with it.
A. Motivation
Many of the technologies on which the Internet has been
built were designed before the globalisation of the Internet was
envisaged. Vulnerabilities in software processes and security
systems are frequently discovered and give opportunities for
hackers to gain access to remote systems and information.
There is a perception that the motivation behind security
attacks is altering [1]. At one time perpetrators were often
teenagers, gaining access to systems to demonstrate prowess.
Now however, organised criminal groups are exploiting secu-
rity loop holes to gain access to sensitive information such as
credit card numbers. It is estimated that up to 8 million credit
card numbers were stolen in one attack alone in 2003 [2].
Networks of compromised hosts are being used to launch
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in an attempt
to extort money from online businesses [3].
B. Interactive Network Sensors
Network security is maintained using a variety of tools
and techniques. Software processes and services are patched
regularly, to remove vulnerabilities. Firewalls are configured
to restrict access to hosts, only allowing traffic to pass through
that matches specified criteria [4]. Network Intrusion Detection
Systems (NIDS) are deployed to report on known malicious
traffic [5]. These techniques rely heavily on prior knowledge
of existing exploits. Although there are systems that incor-
porate anomaly detection, most systems rely predominantly
on pattern matching. Consequently new exploits are still very
hard to secure against, especially where they are used to take
advantage of previously unidentified vulnerabilities.
Interactive Network Sensors (often referred to as honeypots
or honeynets) are another tool in the network security armoury
[6]. In essence they are monitoring systems that are used to
observe attackers activities. The hosts run standard services
but are unadvertised, meaning that there is no legitimate
reason for communicating with them. However, illegitimate
traffic from, for instance, a hacker scanning for potential
targets or a worm exploiting the address space randomly,
are detected. Through the analysis of attackers activities, new
exploits can be revealed and the motivation behind attacks can
be understood. Interactive Network Sensors are a means of
reconnaissance, of keeping in touch with the current activities
of the hi-tech criminals.
Interactive Network Sensors may be deployed in a number
of ways. There are high interaction and low interaction sensors.
High Interaction Sensors are designed to allow hackers the
ability to interact with the host just as they would any other
target. Hosts may be compromised and used at the hacker’s
discretion, for reconnaissance, communication or even as a
zombie for a further attack. The time span for these activities
could be anything from seconds to months. The activity
is monitored giving useful information about the tools the
hackers use and sometimes revealing the motives behind the
attacks. Low Interaction Sensors emulate the responses of a
designated server. They are designed to allow some interaction
but greatly restrict the scope of the hacker. Specifically, a
hacker would not be able to install software nor launch further
attacks. Low Interaction Sensors are not truly compromised;
they emulate responses.
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C. Low Interaction Sensors
The tools presented in this paper are aimed primarily at Low
Interaction honeypot data.
The honeypots used in this project aim mainly to generate
bulk statistics (rather than investigate individual attacks) to
give an overall profile of a site and to correlate between
multiple sites. It is expected that these aggregated statistics
will show seasonal variations, according to the time of day,
day of week etc.
Low-interaction honeypots are suitable for this task, as they
are simple to deploy and don’t need complete realism in
their emulation. These sensors run emulated services that can
interact, to a point, with a user. This enables them to emulate
more services and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses per site as
they are less resource intensive. This enables large numbers
of low Interaction Sensors to be deployed, giving a reasonable
sample of activity across the IP address space. The honeypots
used in this project capture and store all packets whereas
most honeypots only log a small number of statistics per flow
(similar to NIDS).
II. METHODS
In this section the configuration of the honeypots used is
discussed, along with the design of the query and visualisation
tool used to analyse the data produced.
A. Honeypots
Each honeypot system comprises a single machine running
open source Honeypot software (Honeyd1) at a low-interaction
level. A set of monitoring, management and security scripts
are incorporated. The entire software application works using
a ‘Live’ CD that runs OpenBSD 3.72. The sensor design is
focused around a secure and maintainable Honeypot, which
provides full packet capture and storage of Internet traffic
directed to it. A daily log, consisting of 24 hours worth of
Internet traffic, is captured in a raw binary format (pcap); start-
ing from midnight of each day. Whilst the complete operating
system and scripts reside in memory (a feature of the ‘Live’
CD) the actual captured traffic is stored in the form of logs on
the hard disk. These logs are transferred to central computers
for post-processing and analysis. The Honeypot contains two
network interfaces. One interface captures Honeypot traffic
from emulated machines; each with a unique IP address. The
other interface provides a management interface to a single
access computer. This management interface is secured by
the native OpenBSD firewall “Packet Filter”. The Honeypot
software (Honeyd) runs scripts that emulates (to a limited
extent) several common services such as web servers (IIS and
APACHE), FTP servers, SSH servers and TELNET. It also
emulates the operating systems in various UNIX and Microsoft
flavours. In addition to the emulated services provided by
honeyd, the software implements the correct ARP response
mechanism for emulated IP addresses (as and when required)
via custom scripts.
1http://www.honeyd.org/
2http://www.openbsd.org/37.html
1) Sites: There are currently four active sites located in
various locations around the UK. These honeypots capture data
on 8, 12, 28 and 1024 IP address. The number and types of
services emulated in each honeypot vary with the number of
addresses on the honeypot.
B. Honey Plotter
To assist in the navigation of the data produced by the
honeypots, a web-based query and visualisation tool was
developed; called Honey Plotter. This tool is in two halves:
a database for storing the packet headers and meta data, and
a web-based user interface for querying the database and
producing visualisations.
1) Data Storage: By storing the information about the traf-
fic from the honeypots in a database, it allows the information
to be easily queried in a flexible manner. The database of
choice, for this application, was PostgreSQL3. PostgreSQL is a
free, high-performance database, which conveniently supports
network data types, such as IP and MAC addresses, natively.
The main issue is which data should be stored in the database.
The obvious choice is to store the packet headers in the
database, as they already conform to a structure that can
be easily used in this context and they allow many useful
questions to be asked about the data. For example, using the
packet header information we can construct the distribution
of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) ports, for a given
time window, which gives a good indication of the types of
malicious traffic on the network. As the whole packets are
already stored, in the pcap files, we can refer back to them
for any information not in the database, such as the packet
content.
The particular header information stored is the standard
fields from the following layer 2, 3 and 4 protocols:
• Ethernet
• IP
• TCP
• UDP
• ICMP
In addition to the protocol headers listed above, various
meta-data is stored. Information about each pcap file is stored;
the filename, the honeypot location, the first and last packet
timestamps and the total number of packets and bytes. This
allows some more general queries to be performed, such as the
number of bytes per month per site, without having to query
the individual packet information. Also, each packet has the
file it came from, the timestamp and its length stored.
Finally, several auxiliary tables are stored in the database to
allow port numbers, protocols and the location of IP addresses
to be converted to a more useful, human-readable form.
2) User Interface: In addition to the database, a web-based
user interface was created to provide an easy way to construct
visualisations from queries of the data.
The tools used to develop this interface were Perl/CGI,
AJAX (Google MapsTMAPI) and gnuplot. These tools were
3http://www.postgresql.org/
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Fig. 1. Main query interface for Honey Plotter
chosen because they allowed rapid development of the system
(due both to their power for this type of application and the
familiarity the developers have with them).
The main query interface is shown in Figure 1.
For this initial version of Honey Plotter, a fairly simple (low-
level) interface was decided upon. This consists mainly of a
textbox for the user to input an Structured Query Language
(SQL) query. The main work behind-the-scenes was to map the
results of this query to the selected visualisation type. There
are four types of visualisation:
Table This is just a nicely formated version of the
table returned by the database for the given
query.
Line graph This takes the first two columns of the returned
table and uses the first column as the x-axis and
the second as the y-axis. There is an option in
the interface to specify that the x-axis should
be treated as a timestamp.
Histogram This works in much the same way as the line
graph, only this time the first column is used
as the labels for each column in the histogram.
Map This requires the returned table to have four
columns labelled: count, countryname, latitude
and longitude. These are then used via the
Google MapsTMAPI, to produce an interactive
map of the data. Each location is given a
coloured flag (based on the value of count),
which, when clicked on, will show the country
name and count value.
Examples of the different visualisation can be seen in the
case studies presented in the Results section.
3) Statistical Analysis: A challenge facing the community
is that of automated data analysis. As honeypots have no
legitimate use, all traffic observed to and from a sensor must,
by definition, either be misdirected or illegitimate. However,
of the large volume of illegitimate traffic on today’s Internet,
much is of little direct interest from the perspective of learning
about new and emerging attacks. Port scans for instance are
constantly being attempted across the IP address space, but
Fig. 2. Change over time of number of packets sent to the honeypot at site 1
there is little to gain through the detailed analysis of such
data; although knowledge of new ports being scanning may be
useful. The packets are usually generated automatically by, for
example, compromised hosts and yield little new information.
The value of analysing this background of automated tools,
searching for poorly secured systems to infect, is at a sharp
contrast to the value of analysing the activities of human
beings, perhaps using a new exploit, determinedly targeting
a specific host. Consequently, tools are needed that are able
to distinguish between the melee of illegitimate but uninter-
esting background noise, and the illegitimate and genuinely
interesting new exploits or targeted attacks.
In addition to the manual interaction, via the web-based
interface, the Honey Plotter tools include statistical analysis
scripts can be run on the underlying database to find anomalies
in the data based on ‘significant’ changes in distribution. For
example, a script was developed to construct Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) statistic values for TCP port distribution and
time-to-live, with various time windows, for the the compar-
ative distributions. This information was then plotted using
gnuplot.
III. RESULTS
Table I shows a summary of the data gathered from all of
the honeypots, up until the end of February 2007. The table
gives the total number of bytes captured by the honeypot and
the average number of bytes per IP address per month.
Honey Plotter is used to conduct the following two short
case studies. For the case studies, only Site 1 is analysed.
Figure 2 shows how the traffic rate has changed over the
lifetime of the honeypot.
A. Case Study 1: Geographic source change over time
This case study looks at the changes in geographic distri-
bution of malicious traffic over time.
Figure 3 shows the geographic distribution from the first
whole month (March 2006)4. The countries sending the most
malicious traffic are Romania and Ireland. There is also quite
4See the PDF version of this paper for colour images
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TABLE I
DATA CAPTURE SUMMARY FOR ALL SITES. SITE 2 EMULATES 1024 IP ADDRESSES BUT ONLY 12 ARE STORED IN THIS VERSION OF THE DATABASE.
SITE 4 HAD NOT COLLECTED ITS FIRST WHOLE MONTH OF DATA AT THE TIME OF WRITING.
Site IPs Months collecting Total Traffic (Bytes) Average Traffic per IP per Month
1 12 13 1,473,087,125 9,442,866
2 1024 (12) 5 53,127,805 885,463
3 28 4 1,141,985,521 10,196,299
4 8 0 0 0
Fig. 3. Geographic distribution of malicious traffic (number of packets sent)
from March 2006
a lot of traffic from Russia, China and the United States (not
shown in the figure).
As time goes on, there is an increase in malicious traffic
from Europe and Southeast Asia. Figure 4 shows the geo-
graphic distribution from December 2006 with many more Eu-
ropean and Southeast Asian countries sending large numbers
of packets.
Another interesting thing to note is the large number of
different countries that are sending traffic.
B. Case Study 2: TCP port distribution over time
The second case study focuses on the TCP port distribution
over time.
The TCP port distribution is fairly consistent over the
13 month lifetime of the honeypot. The most common TCP
ports, in most months, are 1433, 139 and 445. The official
use of these ports are Microsoft SQL Server (1433), NetBIOS
(139) and Active Directory (445). However, as this is a
honeypot, no user is likely to be attempting to uses these
services legitimately. Each of these ports also corresponds
to common worm attacks. SQL Server has a known buffer
overflow vulnerability on port 1433 that is attacked by, for
example, the SQL Snake worm. Port 445 is used by worms
like Sasser and Korgo, exploiting the LSASS vulnerability and
Fig. 4. Geographic distribution of malicious traffic (number of packets sent)
from December 2006
port 139 is used as an alternative port for Sasser (suggesting
this is the most likely cause of the traffic on port 445, as both
ports have heavy traffic).
Figure 5 shows a typical month, with the above ports being
the most commonly used.
At one point, port 1433 becomes very dominant (which
correlated to an increase in traffic from Russia); beginning
in May 2006 and eclipsing most other traffic in June and July,
before returning to more normal levels. Figure 6 shows the
TCP port distribution for July 2006, with virtually all traffic
being on port 1433.
The next two most common ports are 5900 and 135. 135 is
fairly consistently in the top 4 or 5 ports over the whole data.
It is officially the port for the Microsoft RPC Locator Service
but is most likely the Nachi or MSBlast worms.
Port 5900 is used by the VNC remote desktop protocol
but in around May 2006 an exploit was released5, which
corresponds to its first appearance in the top 10. Over the
next few months the port usage became much more common.
See Figure 5 for its position in November 2006.
One final interesting event was a sudden spike in the usage
of port 80, in August 2006.
5http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17978
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Fig. 5. The TCP port distribution for November 2006.
Fig. 6. The TCP port distribution for July 2006.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A web-based query and visualisation tool for analysing
data from low-interaction honeypots has been presented. The
tool allows a flexible approach to analysing malicious traffic
gathered by multiple honeypots along with accompanying
scripts to assist in the detection of anomalies in the data. As
the underlying database is created from pcap files, it can be
generalised to any network monitoring data. Two small case
studies were also presented to show the types of information
that can be gained from using Honey Plotter.
Future work on Honey Plotter will be focused in two
main areas. The first area is optimising the database structure
to minimise the query time for the most common types of
queries, by precalculating summaries of the data at various
resolutions; for example, by day, by week and by month.
In addition, the inclusion of NIDS output (such as snort6)
may be a useful addition. The second area is improving the
user interface and graphing capabilities. The current version
requires queries to be input as SQL but it could be much
improved by selecting date ranges from calendars, drop-down
menus for field selection, etc. In addition, the graphs currently
only support one line or set of bars. By improving this, the
system will have much greater flexibility. Also, the addition
6http://www.snort.org/
of new types of visualisations, based on previous research [7],
will be considered.
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